Who has the burden of proof, the theists or the atheists?
The first thing I ought to say on this matter is that the term ‘burden of proof’ should really be supplanted for ‘burden of evidence’, for as Bertrand Russell showed with his celestial teapot illustration, it is impossible to prove a negative existential claim (that is, a claim that a thing does not exist), and it is impossible on these terms to prove the positive to that negative. As Christians we do not offer proof that God exists or that Christ was God incarnate – we supply evidence and testimony which assist people in building their epistemological framework. Unless the theist and atheist admit this from the outset there will probably be a stalemate. Before we get on to the theistic situation, let me recount a famous story from the Hellenistic period:
There was a Sophist philosopher Protagoras who agreed to instruct Euathlus in rhetoric so the latter could practice law. Euathlus in turn agreed to pay Protagoras his fee only after winning his first case. However, Euathlus chose not to practice law upon completing his training, and so Protagoras sued him for his fee. Protagoras maintained that he should be paid no matter what; he argued that if he won the case he should be paid by order of the court; while if he lost he should be paid by the terms of his agreement with Euathlus. Euathlus, who had learned something from his study with Protagoras, maintained that he should not pay no matter what; he argued that if he won the case he should not pay by order of the court; while if he lost he should not pay by the terms of his agreement with Protagoras
This describes a stalemate much like the stalemate often reached when theists and atheists argue about the burden of proof and with whom it should lay. Just like the case above, burdens of proof are often dilemmas that invariably lead to counter-dilemmas – one must define exactly what the belief is before any talk of burden of proof – after all, most of the atheists I have met do not disbelieve in the actual God of the Bible, they disbelieve in a God that they have created or imagined in their own heads. Let’s have a look at how the situation with Protagoras and Euathlus created a stalemate and how it is synonymous with position of the theist and atheist. Protagoras had a rather disingenuous scheme in bringing the suit in the first place, but the situation really boils down to Euathlus wanting to show off his mental dexterity. Had Euathlus hired another lawyer he could have escaped the paradoxical situation in which he found himself; if he won with a lawyer, his victory would be non-paradoxical, and if he lost with a lawyer, he would have not yet won his first case. But even if he appeared in a stalemate, one might suggest that equity favours Protagoras, and that if he’d have sued in a second case he would have won.
Yet equally a judge could put paid to this by ordering a reconstitution of the contractual boundaries, or he could decree that this case will not count as Euathlus's first case. Without bringing in policies or principles of this kind, in fact, it is difficult to see how the case could be decided, since the only positive argument favouring both Protagoras and Euathlus relies on a contradiction in the alternative position. Here we see that if the two arguments are truly equal in weight, the one with the burden of proof must find himself in the more precarious position out of the two (in this case this works against the plaintiff Protagoras). The only way this can be resolved outside of the demarcation lines is if one of the two men relents and offers the hand of grace to the other, or if the contract is positively reformed in equity by an external agent.
It is often thought that because the theists are claiming a positive (that there is a God) to the atheists’ negative (that there is no God) this means that the burden lies with the theists, but I have never been happy with this conclusion, and it is for this reason. However far back we search philosophically in trying to ascertain why we exist at all we will not find a good epistemological trail by simply going back further and further expecting the answer to lie in something elementally simple. In naturalistic terms, whatever we ascribe to the meaning of existence we will have to omit the thing itself – nature cannot contain her own explanation unless she is self-evident, and that is impossible. In other words, how the universe came about cannot be explained by the laws of nature – however far back you go looking for an explanation, the last initial explanation still needs explaining if one is a naturalist. However far back you go, you still need an initial explanation of causation – otherwise you are faced with an infinite regress and thus the burden is too great to reconcile with the truth.
As I said, if we keep going back further we eventually reach a point where we have to admit that existence cannot contain its own explanation - there must be something that is self-evident, and such a Being would be infinitely complex. The Christian has a positive answer to this dilemma; he contends that the source of all human activity, that is, the power behind human decision making, is from a Being that exists outside of nature itself. The Christian cannot reconcile the whole complex nexus of choice, free will, moral conscience, emotions and, most importantly, existence itself with an impersonal and uncaring nature – much less settle for an infinite regress as his best explanation; for he knows that in order to avoid the infinite regress problem he must contend that there is something of a priori infinite complexity that bootstraps existence - a fact that is self-evident, a fact that has no cause - a fact that contains its own explanation. The Christian has found the explanation that contradicts the logical hiatus that sullies the infinite regress problem.
Given the foregoing analysis – a logical truth that I cannot get beyond – the burden lies with the atheist not the theist, for the atheist has the infinite regress problem to surmount before he can discharge any burden.
What I have described thus far is the cardinal difficulty for the atheist – a difficulty which removes the manacles from the theist. But in truth this is an area of analysis that is scarcely reached, after all, most sceptics really want to bemoan a lack of evidence for any supernatural God, so now the discussion between the theist and atheist becomes a bit like a case in a court of law (as per above). In an ordinary court of law case, the burden of proof (as much as proof can ever be obtained) is on the prosecution counsel; the prosecuting lawyer must convince the jury that the defendant is guilty – hence the term ‘innocent until proven guilty’. If the prosecution counsel fails to present enough convincing evidence, the jury will ordinarily acquit the defendant.
With Christian apologetics and other forms of justification for the existence of God, we are like the defendant being cross-examined by a prosecuting atheism – unless we can be shown to be guilty of fallacy we should be acquitted. There will, however, be times when this scenario is not played out – the atheist will probably not think it worth his while trying to prosecute and he will probably insist that as he has been given no reason to believe, he can be justified with his atheism. In effect, what he’s saying is "I don't believe in God because no one has provided me with any credible evidence that God exists". And this, of course, is a duty we must take up in convincing the atheist that God is ready to reveal Himself to all who ask.
Here in admitting this we have uncovered something very important when it comes to burdens of evidence. The atheist when he adopts a rather arbitrary form of atheism actually impels the theist to shoulder the burden. In other words, the one who says there is probably no God impels the theist to say why he thinks there is a God, but the one who says there is almost certainly no God stigmatises himself with the burden of demonstrating why he is so convinced. So we see that burdens of evidence depend on the claim being made, but they are also conditioned by the strength of the convictions of those debating the issue in the first place.
I have shown why the burden of proof or burden of evidence is epistemologically intractable, but I have also shown why, if it lays anywhere first off, it lays with the atheist – he must explain what if not God can contain its own explanation. But as we know, when it comes to this problem the atheists choose to disregard the problem and choose to live in denial; roughly, “If I don’t think about it, it no longer remains a problem”. Instead they hope to justify their position by claiming that if such an awesome God exists He would ‘prove His existence’, or that there would at least be better evidence of His existence, and this is what I will tackle in next week’s article.
The first thing I ought to say on this matter is that the term ‘burden of proof’ should really be supplanted for ‘burden of evidence’, for as Bertrand Russell showed with his celestial teapot illustration, it is impossible to prove a negative existential claim (that is, a claim that a thing does not exist), and it is impossible on these terms to prove the positive to that negative. As Christians we do not offer proof that God exists or that Christ was God incarnate – we supply evidence and testimony which assist people in building their epistemological framework. Unless the theist and atheist admit this from the outset there will probably be a stalemate. Before we get on to the theistic situation, let me recount a famous story from the Hellenistic period:
There was a Sophist philosopher Protagoras who agreed to instruct Euathlus in rhetoric so the latter could practice law. Euathlus in turn agreed to pay Protagoras his fee only after winning his first case. However, Euathlus chose not to practice law upon completing his training, and so Protagoras sued him for his fee. Protagoras maintained that he should be paid no matter what; he argued that if he won the case he should be paid by order of the court; while if he lost he should be paid by the terms of his agreement with Euathlus. Euathlus, who had learned something from his study with Protagoras, maintained that he should not pay no matter what; he argued that if he won the case he should not pay by order of the court; while if he lost he should not pay by the terms of his agreement with Protagoras
This describes a stalemate much like the stalemate often reached when theists and atheists argue about the burden of proof and with whom it should lay. Just like the case above, burdens of proof are often dilemmas that invariably lead to counter-dilemmas – one must define exactly what the belief is before any talk of burden of proof – after all, most of the atheists I have met do not disbelieve in the actual God of the Bible, they disbelieve in a God that they have created or imagined in their own heads. Let’s have a look at how the situation with Protagoras and Euathlus created a stalemate and how it is synonymous with position of the theist and atheist. Protagoras had a rather disingenuous scheme in bringing the suit in the first place, but the situation really boils down to Euathlus wanting to show off his mental dexterity. Had Euathlus hired another lawyer he could have escaped the paradoxical situation in which he found himself; if he won with a lawyer, his victory would be non-paradoxical, and if he lost with a lawyer, he would have not yet won his first case. But even if he appeared in a stalemate, one might suggest that equity favours Protagoras, and that if he’d have sued in a second case he would have won.
Yet equally a judge could put paid to this by ordering a reconstitution of the contractual boundaries, or he could decree that this case will not count as Euathlus's first case. Without bringing in policies or principles of this kind, in fact, it is difficult to see how the case could be decided, since the only positive argument favouring both Protagoras and Euathlus relies on a contradiction in the alternative position. Here we see that if the two arguments are truly equal in weight, the one with the burden of proof must find himself in the more precarious position out of the two (in this case this works against the plaintiff Protagoras). The only way this can be resolved outside of the demarcation lines is if one of the two men relents and offers the hand of grace to the other, or if the contract is positively reformed in equity by an external agent.
It is often thought that because the theists are claiming a positive (that there is a God) to the atheists’ negative (that there is no God) this means that the burden lies with the theists, but I have never been happy with this conclusion, and it is for this reason. However far back we search philosophically in trying to ascertain why we exist at all we will not find a good epistemological trail by simply going back further and further expecting the answer to lie in something elementally simple. In naturalistic terms, whatever we ascribe to the meaning of existence we will have to omit the thing itself – nature cannot contain her own explanation unless she is self-evident, and that is impossible. In other words, how the universe came about cannot be explained by the laws of nature – however far back you go looking for an explanation, the last initial explanation still needs explaining if one is a naturalist. However far back you go, you still need an initial explanation of causation – otherwise you are faced with an infinite regress and thus the burden is too great to reconcile with the truth.
As I said, if we keep going back further we eventually reach a point where we have to admit that existence cannot contain its own explanation - there must be something that is self-evident, and such a Being would be infinitely complex. The Christian has a positive answer to this dilemma; he contends that the source of all human activity, that is, the power behind human decision making, is from a Being that exists outside of nature itself. The Christian cannot reconcile the whole complex nexus of choice, free will, moral conscience, emotions and, most importantly, existence itself with an impersonal and uncaring nature – much less settle for an infinite regress as his best explanation; for he knows that in order to avoid the infinite regress problem he must contend that there is something of a priori infinite complexity that bootstraps existence - a fact that is self-evident, a fact that has no cause - a fact that contains its own explanation. The Christian has found the explanation that contradicts the logical hiatus that sullies the infinite regress problem.
Given the foregoing analysis – a logical truth that I cannot get beyond – the burden lies with the atheist not the theist, for the atheist has the infinite regress problem to surmount before he can discharge any burden.
What I have described thus far is the cardinal difficulty for the atheist – a difficulty which removes the manacles from the theist. But in truth this is an area of analysis that is scarcely reached, after all, most sceptics really want to bemoan a lack of evidence for any supernatural God, so now the discussion between the theist and atheist becomes a bit like a case in a court of law (as per above). In an ordinary court of law case, the burden of proof (as much as proof can ever be obtained) is on the prosecution counsel; the prosecuting lawyer must convince the jury that the defendant is guilty – hence the term ‘innocent until proven guilty’. If the prosecution counsel fails to present enough convincing evidence, the jury will ordinarily acquit the defendant.
With Christian apologetics and other forms of justification for the existence of God, we are like the defendant being cross-examined by a prosecuting atheism – unless we can be shown to be guilty of fallacy we should be acquitted. There will, however, be times when this scenario is not played out – the atheist will probably not think it worth his while trying to prosecute and he will probably insist that as he has been given no reason to believe, he can be justified with his atheism. In effect, what he’s saying is "I don't believe in God because no one has provided me with any credible evidence that God exists". And this, of course, is a duty we must take up in convincing the atheist that God is ready to reveal Himself to all who ask.
Here in admitting this we have uncovered something very important when it comes to burdens of evidence. The atheist when he adopts a rather arbitrary form of atheism actually impels the theist to shoulder the burden. In other words, the one who says there is probably no God impels the theist to say why he thinks there is a God, but the one who says there is almost certainly no God stigmatises himself with the burden of demonstrating why he is so convinced. So we see that burdens of evidence depend on the claim being made, but they are also conditioned by the strength of the convictions of those debating the issue in the first place.
I have shown why the burden of proof or burden of evidence is epistemologically intractable, but I have also shown why, if it lays anywhere first off, it lays with the atheist – he must explain what if not God can contain its own explanation. But as we know, when it comes to this problem the atheists choose to disregard the problem and choose to live in denial; roughly, “If I don’t think about it, it no longer remains a problem”. Instead they hope to justify their position by claiming that if such an awesome God exists He would ‘prove His existence’, or that there would at least be better evidence of His existence, and this is what I will tackle in next week’s article.
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